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17.1 Introduction
International tax law has evolved rapidly around the world over
the last one hundred years.
Legislation, case law, and
administrative practice have at times developed in a coordinated
and policy-grounded fashion.
At other times, changes might be
explained more by the particular and specific pressures of a
moment.
Despite
significant
differences
in
the
policy
directions of jurisdictions, all jurisdictions confront the
same, fundamental tax policy decisions and many of the same
pressures.
This chapter focuses on the international tax policy directions
of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS).
Scholars like Reuven Avi-Yonah have argued that there is
sufficient coherence to international tax law that it forms part
of international law.1 The BRICS countries present something of
a counter-story to the narrative that international tax law has
harmonized.
These five countries, major economic and trade
players in the world but not members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have developed
their international tax policy with an eye to the approach
suggested by the OECD, but not necessarily in conformity with
its strictures. Over the last twenty years the BRICS have been
mentioned in tandem and they have taken modest steps to confer
with one another.
Yet, their political, economic, and social
contexts are different.
Given their increasing role as both
sites of commercial expansion and their power as exporters of
resources and capital, it seems they might be
natural
international tax policy allies.
This chapter explores the international tax policy directions of
the BRICS jurisdictions under the familiar, broad heads of
international tax policy: jurisdiction to tax, double tax
relief, anti-avoidance measures, and exchange of information.2 A
complete review of the international tax policy directions of
Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
2 The BRICS countries work together on at least some of these
areas of international tax policy. See e.g.
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=91684
1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711300

any one of these jurisdictions on its own could easily become a
book.
As a result, the chapter focuses on providing a general
and comparative overview, based on the material provided in the
chapters presented earlier, and is centred on income taxation.3
17.2 Jurisdiction to Tax:

Defining a Country’s Tax Reach

All countries that impose an income tax do so on the basis that
income has a source in the jurisdiction. In other words, it is
widely accepted that where a taxpayer receives income from
activities
with
a
connection
to
a
jurisdiction,
that
jurisdiction has a justifiable claim to tax the related income.
Most countries also impose an income tax on the basis of the
residence of the taxpayer.
Where a taxpayer has a sufficient
economic connection to the jurisdiction (to be resident there),
the jurisdiction may impose an income tax on the income of the
taxpayer, often regardless of where the income has its source.
Each country needs to make a policy judgment about the
parameters of its tax reach within that broad framework:
Will
it tax residents on their worldwide income?
What types of
income will be subject to tax at source?
How will the
jurisdiction know that a particular income return is sourced in
the country? A long list of factors inform the policy judgement
call made on each of these issues:
how effective is the
jurisdiction’s tax administration, how much inbound and outbound
investment occurs, what is the nature of inbound investment –
does it take the form of investment in manufacturing, services,
or natural resources, for example.
In the main, the concept that captures when an individual or
corporation has sufficient economic nexus with a jurisdiction to
be considered taxable on income, possibly on a worldwide basis,
in that jurisdiction is the concept of “residence”. While other
There are few outstanding comparative tax law texts. To see
comparative work at its best, see Hugh Ault et al, Comparative
Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis (Boston: Kluwer Law
International, 1997); Reuven Avi-Yonah et al, Global
Perspectives on Income Taxation Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011); Guy Peters, The Politics of Taxation:
A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil
Blackwell Ltd., 1991); Cedric Sandford, Why Tax Systems Differ:
A Comparative Study of the Political Economy of Taxation (Bath:
Fiscal Publications, 2000); and Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax
Law (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003). There are even
fewer good comparative projects that focus on the experience of
middle and low income countries.
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concepts of country allegiance are occasionally adopted by
countries to reflect a strong political (citizenship) or
intentional (domicile) association with the jurisdiction, most
countries in the word have, as a policy matter, chosen residence
as the operational concept. The indicia of residence (a strong
economic nexus) vary by jurisdiction.
For individuals, many
countries choose to use a “facts and circumstances” test that
attempts to determine and weigh the degree of an individual’s
connections with the country. For companies, most jurisdictions
use an incorporation or a central management and control (an
often rough-and-ready, relatively basic facts and circumstances
text) test for residence.
Once a taxpayer has been determined
to be a resident, the next question is what scope of income
should be taxed in the residence state.
Some countries choose
to tax all income, no matter where earned (worldwide), while
others focus only on income with a source in the country
(territorial).
Practically speaking, most countries adopt
something in between those two extremes. Certainly, high income
countries, who served as the starting homes for multinational
businesses, tended to adopt residence-based taxation, which
provided them with the ability to capture (for tax purposes)
some of the revenue associated with activities with a source in
lower-income countries.
The BRICS countries, very generally, have a mixed history with
worldwide versus territorial systems. For example, beginning in
1995, Brazil moved from a largely territorial system, to a
system of worldwide, residence-based taxation.4 At this point in
their histories, all of the BRICS countries have adopted a
system of world-wide taxation, based on the residence concept.
Brazil’s evolution to a worldwide system of taxation reveals
something fundamental about not just Brazil, but the general
orientation of all of the BRICS countries: they each prioritize
taxation at source, in spite of moves to tax the income of
residents no matter where it is earned.
At least some of the
BRICS countries face a going-forward dilemma.
While they have
at least historically been capital importing countries, now all
of the BRICS jurisdictions have at least a few major trading
partner countries with whom they are the capital exporting
jurisdiction.
The challenge of designing an approach to
international taxation that best preserves the ability of the
BRICS to raise badly needed revenue is not necessarily clear.

Fernando Da G. Lôbo D’Éça, “Brazil” in IFA Cahiers, Trends in
company/shareholder taxation: single or double taxation? (2003
Sydney Congress) at 212.
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In setting the scope for source taxation, countries need to
decide on the geographic source rule on which they will rely.
Formal
geographic
source
rules
are
comparatively
straightforward: they set the geographic source of income in a
way that is administratively feasible.
For example, the
geographic source rule for dividend payments is often the
residence of the payor. Alternatively, source rules can aspire
to identify the location where the economic value was produced.
To
illustrate,
a
geographic
source
rule
might
require
identifying the place where a royalty is used and where the
technology was developed and allocating some portion of the
returns to each jurisdiction.
Brazil’s domestic source rules vary in their use of formal
geographic source rules and rules that find their inspiration in
the location of the creation of economic value. For example, in
taxing income from services, Brazil taxes income based on the
source of payment (rather than, for example, the location of
production and provision of the services).
Similarly, South
Africa’s domestic source rules rely on determining the place of
the originating cause of the income, which generally has
required a substantive inquiry into the place where the main
activities were performed that give rise to the income.
Having raised the thorny issues of how to appropriately balance
source and residence-taxation, and recognizing that all BRICS
countries value the imposition of source taxation, this chapter
turns to discuss the issue of how much of a country’s source
jurisdiction should be ceded in bilateral tax treaties.
While
tax treaties might serve a number of purposes, in the context of
capital importing jurisdictions, the most important result of a
tax treaty is that the source jurisdiction sacrifices some of
its taxing jurisdiction.
The mechanisms for enabling the
sacrifice of source taxation might be broadly classified into
two types. First, the source jurisdiction sometimes sacrifices
its taxing rights by raising the threshold for taxation.
For
example, most countries impose tax on the activities of a person
or entity when it carries on business in the jurisdiction. Tax
treaties raise that threshold for taxation and require that the
entity has a “permanent establishment” in the jurisdiction.
Second, source jurisdictions might set maximum rates of tax to
be levied on particular types of payments. So, for example, in
domestic law a country might impose a 30 percent gross
withholding tax on royalty payments.
It might agree to reduce
that rate to 10 percent by treaty.
Each of the BRICS countries has decided to enter into at least
some bilateral tax treaties. Brazil has the smallest number of
treaties in force: 36. This suggests that Brazil has been the

most cautious in agreeing to sacrifice source-based tax revenue
of the BRICS jurisdictions. In contrast to the Brazil’s slower
expansion of its tax treaty network over forty or so years,
China entered into its first bilateral treaty in 1983 and since
then has entered into 98 more; South Africa has 74 tax treaties
in force, almost all of which were signed after 1994; India
signed its first treaty in 1958 and has negotiated 98 treaties;
and Russia has negotiated 88 tax treaties.
The policy
considerations relevant for BRICS countries in deciding to enter
into tax treaties are likely more complicated than for other
categories of countries.
For BRICS countries, at least
historically, entering into tax treaties would have meant
sacrificing source-based tax revenue (because they were capital
importing countries with most treaty partners). As noted above,
over time, as BRICS countries have gained economic power, the
story is less clear.
In many instances, BRICS countries might
now be the capital exporter in a treaty relationship.
As is obvious already, Brazil’s history is particularly
poignant.
Given that Brazil historically had a territoriallybased tax system, there was no advantage (in terms of the
revenue results) to entering into a tax treaty.
Since it did
not impose a tax on its residents’ world-wide incomes, Brazil
would only be sacrificing revenue to its treaty partners if it
entered into tax treaties.
In this era, Brazil nevertheless
undertook some treaty negotiations, often with the aspiration of
negotiating a tax sparing provision that it hoped would
facilitate investment in Brazil.5
Most famously, Brazil
negotiated a tax treaty with the United States in the 1960s that
was not ratified by the U.S. Senate largely because of the
presence of the tax sparing provision.
A detailed review of the tax treaty policy of the BRICS is
provided in Chapter X.
This chapter reviews the tax policy
reflected in the decision to sacrifice tax revenue on business
profits and investment returns reflected in the tax treaties of
the BRICS countries.
Business profits and investment returns
were chosen because they illustrate the two main approaches to
source-taxation revenue-sacrifice: a rise in the threshold for
taxation and a limit on the rate.
17.2.1 Sacrificing tax revenue on business profit
Tax treaties reduce the taxation of business income by source
states.
They generally do this by elevating the threshold for
business taxation.
All double tax treaties employ the
5
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“permanent establishment” threshold concept.
Put simply,
business activities are not subject to tax at source until the
activity is carried on through a permanent establishment:
a
fixed place through which the business is wholly or partly
carried on.6 Given the “fixed” and tangible nature of the kinds
of places identified in the permanent establishment article, and
given the change to the provision of valuable resources and
assets of a less tangible and permanent nature, it is widely
accepted that the permanent establishment threshold is set at a
higher level now than might have originally been intended when
more business was carried out through, for example, an office
with some physical permanence.
The main policy question for
countries that are willing to sacrifice some of their taxing
rights by raising the threshold for business taxation is how
high to raise that threshold.
There are myriad additional
policy questions, of course, including the extent to which
deductions should be allowed in calculating business profits and
whether once a non-resident business has sufficient activity in
the jurisdiction to pass the threshold other activities of that
non-resident in the jurisdiction should be taxed even if they
are not clearly connected to the threshold-passing business.
The OECD model treaty contains a definition of “permanent
establishment” in article 5. That article provides an extended
list of illustrations of activities that constitute a permanent
establishment.
For example, the list includes physical sites
that constitute a permanent establishment (e.g. a quarry or an
office) and periods of time (12 months) a building site or
construction or installation project must continue to be found
to be a permanent establishment. Each of the items on the list
might be adjusted by treaty partners in negotiations to either
elevate or lower the threshold at which business profits will be
subject to tax in the states party to the treaty. In the main,
each of the BRICS countries has at least some treaties that
lower (from the OECD model) the threshold for activities to be
considered permanent establishments (and therefore taxable at
source).
It seems possible to say that the BRICS share a tax
policy that mitigates in favour of the United Nations (UN) model
definition of permanent establishment, at least in some
instances.
In other words, because of the sense that source
taxation is more important in BRICS states than in higher-income
countries, the BRICS countries tend to favour, in at least some
cases, the adoption of provisions from the UN model, which
preserves greater scope for taxation at source.

See e.g. Ekkehart Reimer et al, Permanent Establishments (The
Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2012).
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In domestic law, Brazil taxes business activities below the
permanent establishment threshold.
Some of this taxing
jurisdiction is ceded in Brazil’s tax treaties, which employ a
mix of OECD and UN model terms. For example, some of Brazil’s
treaties list additional kinds of physical establishments within
the
definition
of
permanent
establishment,
including
a
warehouse, factory or oil rig. The period of time necessary for
an activity to be considered a permanent establishment is
sometimes reduced from 12 to 9 or 6 months.7 It might be noted
that the scope of the permanent establishment article in the
Brazilian context is likely narrower than in other jurisdictions
given that Brazil generally deems a foreign branch to be a
Brazilian entity, removing the need for reliance on the
permanent establishment concept.
Russia has a permanent establishment concept in its domestic
legislation, with a lower threshold for taxation at source than
the OECD model treaty.
For example, Russia’s tax legislation
does not require a time period before a building site becomes a
permanent establishment.
Many of Russia’s treaties, however,
accept the OECD model. Following the building site example, to
illustrate, many of Russia’s treaties adopt the United States
suggestion of 12 months.
India regularly leans toward the UN model in the design of its
permanent establishment article.
For example, India’s treaties
often include a service permanent establishment provision that
deems a service provider to be a permanent establishment after a
threshold period of 3, 6, or 9 months, for example, expires.
India also reduces the period of time before a building site
becomes a permanent establishment from the suggested 12 month
period to 9, 6, or 3 months and defines permanent establishment
more broadly in some cases to include physical structures like a
dredging project or a drilling site.
China has incorporated permanent establishment articles in its
tax treaties and offers an explanation of the concept in its
circular for the determination of permanent establishments and
other
tax
treaty
matters.8
Generally
speaking,
China

See Manoela Floret Silva Xavier, “Brazil” in IFA Cahier, The
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (IFA, 2006).
See also Sergio Rocha, “International Fiscal Imperialism and the
‘Principle’ of the Permanent Establishment” (February 2014)
Bulletin for International Taxation 83 – 86.
8 For an extended discussion of the permanent establishment
concept in China, see Cassie Wong, Matthew Mui and Alan Yam,
“China” in Ekkehart Reimer et al, Permanent Establishments (The
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incorporates
aspects
of
the
definition
of
permanent
establishment reflected in the UN Model Convention, although it
borrows from both the UN and OECD Models.
For example, some
Chinese treaties include in the definition of permanent
establishment assembly and supervisory activities which last
more than 6-months (a shorter period than the 12-months
recommended by the OECD); the provision of services where the
duration exceeds 183 days; and an installation, drilling rig,
ship or structure used for the exploration or exploitation of
natural resources for a period of more than six months.
South Africa generally follows the OECD model in its design of
the business profits and permanent establishment articles;
nevertheless, in a few key instances aspects of the UN model are
incorporated. Sometimes South Africa negotiates for a shorter
period of time for a building or construction site to be
considered a permanent establishment; takes the view that the
furnishing of consultancy services for a period of more than six
months within a twelve-month period constitutes a permanent
establishment; and deems an enterprise that conducts activities
related to exploration or exploitation of natural resources to
be a permanent establishment if it exists for more than six
months.
In addition to lowering the threshold for when an activity might
constitute
a
permanent
establishment
(by
adjusting
the
definition in article 5), some BRICS countries have negotiated
more preferential source taxation in the business profits
article (article 7).
Specifically, in at least some treaties,
BRICS countries have negotiated to follow the UN model treaty in
two respects. First, in some treaties, once an enterprise has a
permanent establishment in a jurisdiction, the treaty enables
the source country to tax all of the income the enterprise
derives in that jurisdiction. This is generally referred to as
a source of attraction rule.
Second, an enterprise might
dramatically reduce its profits taxable in the source state by
allocating a range of deductions to the permanent establishment.
In some cases, BRICS countries have negotiated to restrict the
deduction of some expenses, for example, head office or
administrative expenses, in the calculation of the profit of the
permanent establishment.
Russia, with a very few exceptions,
does not include force of attraction clauses in its treaties,
neither does China.
India, on the other hand, has at least a
few treaties that include the force of attraction rule (although
none of the more recently negotiated treaties include the
Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2012), China.
see Circular GuoShuiFa [2010] No. 75.

For the circular

provision), enabling the taxation of profits from sales of a
similar kind as those sold through the permanent establishment
or from similar business activities.9
In some cases, tax treaties limit the deductibility of expenses
by a permanent establishment. For example, as a general matter,
Brazil does not include the provision from the OECD model treaty
that allows a permanent establishment to deduct executive and
general administrative expenses.10 Similarly, India has some tax
treaties (but not the majority) that do not include the OECD
model’s permissive language on the deduction of expenses.11
China’s approach to deduction of expenses is mixed:
where the
treaty partner is a developed country the scope of deductions is
limited; where the treaty partner is developing, the scope of
deductions is often more expansive.
In addition to these adjustments to articles 5 and 7 to enable
greater scope for source taxation and to facilitate taxation of
more income once a business is determined to have a permanent
establishment, BRICS countries have grappled with the challenge
of taxing income associated with digital activities.
The OECD
has been slow to adapt the permanent establishment definition to
include digital and electronic business within its scope, with
the effect of ensuring greater taxing scope for residence
states. To some extent, BRICS countries have been able to press
for greater taxation in this area through the lens of technical
services, discussed in more detail below.
17.2.2 Reducing the tax rate on investment income
Generally speaking, countries tax investment returns at a flat
rate on the gross payment.
The rationale is simple:
it is
difficult to audit foreigners’ tax returns and often investments
have no real physical location that could be seized by a
domestic tax authority seeking to enforce the tax due.
Three
international tax policy judgements related to the taxation of
investment are explored in this chapter.
First, the decision
about the maximum rate of withholding to agree to in negotiating
Aloke Majumdar and P.V. Satya Prasad, “India” IFA Cahier, 2010
Rome Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of
Anti-Avoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 385.
10 Manoela Floret Silva Xavier, “Brazil” in IFA Cahier, The
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (IFA, 2006)
at 208.
11 Rakesh Kapur and Radhakishan Rawal, “India” in IFA Cahier, The
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (IFA, 2006)
at 399.
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a tax treaty (which limits the source-tax on investment
returns). Second, the decision about how to define the scope of
the royalties provision and specifically, whether technical
services should be included under the royalties or the business
profits articles. Third, the approach to the geographic source
rule, which defines the reach of the tax system, and
specifically, should the test for whether a revenue stream has a
source in the country be the residence of the payor or a more
economically-based rule that looks to the place that causes the
value to arise.
For the most part, BRICS countries reserve the right to agree to
withholding tax rates in excess of those suggested by the OECD,
particularly on the royalties article where the OECD suggests a
0 percent withholding tax rate. Speaking very generally, in the
earlier days of treaty negotiations, the BRICS countries had
more divergent policies, with some countries negotiating rates
higher than those recommended by the OECD and others agreeing to
rates below the OECD’s recommended levels.
More recently, the
countries have cohered around rates, although it is hard to
discern a shared policy.
Brazil’s tax treaty policy generally
retains more scope for source-based investment taxation than
countries who draw on the OECD model.
At least in its early
stages of treaty negotiation, Brazil was likely to maintain a
withholding tax rate on investment income that was higher than
that recommended by the OECD. Generally speaking, the rate was
not reduced below 15%.
In contrast, Russia agreed to a large
number of treaties with 0 percent withholding tax rates on
interest
or
royalties
in
its
earlier
days
of
treaty
negotiations.
More recently, it has negotiated positive
withholding tax rates on all investment returns.
Although
historically India negotiated higher withholding tax rates on
investment income (whether dividends, interest, or royalties),
it has more recently agreed to lower withholding tax rates.12
Russian tax treaties tend to use relatively low withholding tax
rates – normally under 15 percent – for all sources of
investment income.13 South Africa has sought to renegotiate its
treaties with 0 withholding tax rates on dividends, interest,
and royalties in an effort to shore up source-based taxation of
these investment returns.

Anil Kumar Chopra and Rajendra Nayak, “India” in IFA Cahiers,
Trends in company/shareholder taxation: single or double
taxation? (2003 Sydney Congress) at 469.
13 Victor Matchekhin and Roustam Vakhitov, “Russia” in in IFA
Cahiers, Trends in company/shareholder taxation: single or
double taxation? (2003 Sydney Congress) at 775.
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An international tax policy problem of concern for capitalimporting countries is the tax treatment of technical assistance
and services.
These kinds of services can escape source-tax
when the standard OECD model treaty provisions are adopted.
Brazil has tended to press for inclusion of technical assistance
within Article 12 (the royalties article) to ensure that at
least some withholding tax is exacted on payments for technical
services.
Where a service is found not to fit within the
royalty article, the Brazilian administration often takes the
position that it falls within Article 21 (other income) and
should be taxed at source. Generally speaking, India’s treaties
include a separate clause on technical services in the royalties
article. In a few cases, a separate technical fees provision has
been negotiated.14
In the light of a significant amount of
litigation around the scope of the royalties clause, India has
clarified in its domestic legislation that it considers
royalties to include the transfer of all or any rights in
respect of property or information, including the use or right
to use a computer software.
China, like Brazil and India, has
concerns about the ability of large technical services fees to
escape source country taxation, but has not taken steps to
include
technical
fees
under
the
royalties
article.
Nevertheless, China does try in its tax treaties to interpret
royalties broadly to include at least some technical fees and it
imposes a positive withholding tax on royalty payments.
In
contrast to the other BRICS countries, South Africa has taken a
narrower view of the services that might fit within the
royalties provision and characterizes most services as subject
to net tax under the business profits articles. However, South
Africa takes an economically-based approach to its determination
of the source of the payment.
Generally, it views technical
services as provided in the place where the service is rendered
(and not the place of the payor).
This approach can create
conflicts, for example, where a South African country provides
consultancy services to a subsidiary elsewhere in Africa.
In
those circumstances, South Africa takes the position that the
income has its source in South Africa (because that is where the
service is rendered) and the other country may take the position
that the income has the source there (because that is where the
payment for it is made).
Before concluding this section on the international tax policy
reflected in the BRICS approach to defining their tax scope, it
See eg. the 2001 treaty with Uganda, the 1999 treaty with
Pakistan, and the 2005 treaty with Swaziland. Johann Hattingh
and Basil Newton, “South Africa” in IFA Cahier, The Attribution
of Profits to Permanent Establishments (IFA, 2006) at 567 – 570.
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might be worth drawing attention to their approach to the
residual provision in their tax treaties, article 21, which
covers income not otherwise covered by the treaty.
The OECD
model treaty assigns the right to tax “other income” to the
residence state.
In contrast, the UN model preserves source
country taxing rights.
India’s treaties generally grant the
source state the right to tax items of income not dealt with
elsewhere in the treaty.15
Brazil has similarly asserted the
source jurisdiction’s right to tax other income under Article
21, as have China and South Africa. Not only does this approach
to Article 21 change its default allocation of taxing rights,
but also it creates an incentive for BRICS countries to argue in
favour of including a wider scope of income within the “other
income” article.
17.3 Double Tax Relief: Facilitating International Coordination
of Tax Regimes
Given that two (or more) jurisdictions may claim that a
particular income return has its source in those jurisdictions,
that two (or more) jurisdictions may claim that a particular
taxpayer is resident in those jurisdictions, or that both a
residence and a source state may seek to tax the same income
return, all countries have developed some mechanisms for
providing relief from double taxation.
Countries vary in the mechanism they use unilaterally in
domestic legislation to alleviate international double-taxation.
Some countries employ a deduction method (allowing resident
taxpayers to deduct the taxes paid to foreign governments), some
employ an exemption method (by not taxing foreign-sourced
income), and others use a credit method (allowing resident
taxpayers to claim a credit for taxes paid to a foreign
country).
Each of the BRICS countries has decided to
unilaterally provide relief from double taxation by offering a
foreign tax credit.
Tax credit mechanisms require the residence state to provide
credit to its resident taxpayers for taxes paid to the source
state (usually with a limit: the rate of tax in the residence
state).
This domestic method of relieving taxes, therefore,
privileges the source state’s ability to tax.
However, where
the source state chooses not to impose a source-level tax, then
the residence state is able to impose its full taxing
Anil Kumar Chopra and Rajendra Nayak, “India” in IFA Cahiers,
Trends in company/shareholder taxation: single or double
taxation? (2003 Sydney Congress) at 469.
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jurisdiction on that income.
As a result, in at least some
cases, where a source state attempts to offer a tax incentive to
investment by not taking income at source, the potential
incentive effect of that policy decision is eroded because the
residence state simply taxes the income earned.
All of the BRICS countries have negotiated at least some tax
treaties with tax sparing provisions, provisions designed to
alter
this
conventional
relationship
between
source
and
residence state tax systems. Tax sparing provisions enable the
capital importing country to offer tax incentives to attract
foreign investment without fear that the capital exporting
jurisdiction will impose world-wide taxation on its resident
with the result that the tax incentive becomes a transfer of tax
revenue from the capital-importing to the capital-exporting
states.
In design, tax sparing provisions preserve the tax
incentives granted by one jurisdiction (generally a capitalimporting and lower-income jurisdiction) by requiring the other
jurisdiction (generally a capital-exporting and higher-income
jurisdiction) to give a tax credit for the taxes that would have
been paid to the capital-importing country if the incentive had
not been granted.
Some scholars and tax commentators
characterize these tax sparing provisions as tax expenditures
(the equivalent of foreign aid) granted by high-income to lowincome
states;
other
commentators
staunchly
resist
that
characterization and frame tax sparing provisions as provisions
that recognize the right of source (capital-importing) states to
tax income with a strong economic connection to it (and to
respect that right even in the absence of the imposition of
tax).
Brazil has been the staunchest advocate for these kinds of
clauses.
At least in its earlier days of treaty negotiations,
Brazil advocated for tax sparing provisions in its tax treaties,
and sees these not as a means of achieving double tax relief,
but rather as a method for incentivizing investment.16
In more
recent treaty negotiations, Brazil has been less inclined to
negotiate for or agree to tax sparing or matching credit
clauses, likely because Brazil no longer sees itself primarily
as a capital-importing nation.
The other BRICS jurisdictions also have at least some experience
with tax sparing provisions. Russia has negotiated tax sparing
provisions in at least a few treaties. India negotiated tax
sparing provisions and matching credit provisions in well over

Alberto Xavier, “Brazil” in IFA Cahier, Double Non-taxation,
volume 89a ((2004) Vienna Congress) at 227.
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half of its tax treaties.17
However, in India’s recent treaty
negotiations it has not sought or agreed to tax sparing
provisions.
China’s first tax treaty, with Japan, included a
tax sparing clause in favour of China.
A large portion of
China’s tax treaties (roughly half) include tax sparing
provisions of some kind.
However, in 2009 China changed its
policy and it has not negotiated tax sparing provisions in its
tax treaties since then. Finally, although South Africa has
negotiated tax sparing in a few of its treaties, its policy is
not to ask for tax sparing provisions going forward.18
Over time, all of the BRICS jurisdictions have moved away from
negotiating tax sparing provisions, presumably because the case
for incentivizing investment into the BRICS countries has
diminished as has the number of treaty partners for whom a BRICS
country would be the capital importer.
17.4 Anti-Avoidance Measures: Shoring Up Tax Collection
Historically, the main preoccupation of international tax policy
was reducing the potential for international double taxation.
Times have changed.
The gaps between source and residence
taxation, and the ability of taxpayers to develop intricate tax
avoidance and evasion plans, have led to a flurry of interest in
double non-taxation, or instances where taxpayers manage to pay
little or no tax on international income.
Countries have both
acted unilaterally to protect their domestic tax bases and
coordinated
with
other
jurisdictions
to
shore
up
the
international tax system more generally.
Each of the BRICS
countries have taken some steps to better protect their ability
to tax international income, although those steps have not been
taken in tandem or consistently across the four countries. This
part of the chapter explores four anti-avoidance techniques:
incorporating a limitation on benefits provision in tax treaties
and
adopting
transfer
pricing,
thin
capitalization,
and
controlled foreign affiliate regimes in domestic legislation.
17.4.1 Limitation on benefits
Tax treaties often include specific anti-avoidance rules to
address opportunities to avoid tax that might arise in the
Surendra Bhargava, “India” in IFA Cahier, Double Non-taxation,
volume 89a ((2004) Vienna Congress) at 391.
18 Ray Eskinazi, “South Africa” in IFA Cahier, Source and
Residence: New Configuration of Their Principles, volume 90a
(IFA, 2005) at 592.
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context of an individual article; for example, the dividend
article may include a provision that requires identifying the
beneficial owner of the investment to ensure that taxpayers do
not simply establish a legal owner in a residence jurisdiction
to take advantage of a preferential withholding tax rate in
between the treaty of that jurisdiction and the payor
jurisdiction. Led by the United States’ practice, some treaties
include a general limitation on benefits clause. The purpose of
that provision is to restrict the use of the treaty where the
main purpose of the transaction is to secure a treaty benefit in
a way that is contrary to the object and spirit of the tax
treaty.
BRICS countries do not appear to advocate for
limitation on benefits provisions, although they occasionally
agree to them. Brazil has not negotiated a treaty with the full
scope of the limitation on benefits clauses found in treaties
negotiated by the United States. It has, however, negotiated at
least three treaties that include a more general clause that
limits treaty benefits. Russia has a couple of tax treaties with
limitation on benefits provisions; however, it is not Russia’s
practice to ask for that clause. India includes limitation on
benefits provisions in some of its treaties,19 and China has
included that provision in a couple of treaties.20
17.4.2 Transfer pricing
Transfer pricing rules are designed to limit the ability of a
multinational enterprise to manipulate the recognition of its
profit, ideally shifting the allocation of that profit to low or
no-tax jurisdictions.
Generally, transfer pricing rules allow
the government to adjust the prices charged between related
entities with the aid of some appropriate benchmark.
Enacting
transfer pricing rules has become a fundamental plank in the tax
policy options of countries seeking to shore up their domestic
tax regimes:
without a rule to stop related companies from
shifting income “off shore”, the tax liability of resident
taxpayers with non-resident related parties could relatively
simply be reduced to zero.

Surendra Bhargava, “India” in IFA Cahier, Double Non-taxation,
volume 89a ((2004) Vienna Congress) at 406. See also Aloke
Majumdar and P.V. Satya Prasad, “India” IFA Cahier, 2010 Rome
Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of AntiAvoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 382-385.
20 Houlu Yang, “China, People’s Republic of” IFA Cahier, 2010
Rome Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of
Anti-Avoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 230-1.
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Transfer pricing regimes require some method for allocating the
income earned between the related parties. Most countries have
adopted, at least formally, an “arm’s length method”.
The
theory is that prices charged between related entities should be
the same as prices that would have been charged between
independent and unrelated third parties.
BRICS countries have widely different approaches for applying
and enforcing the arm’s length method. Speaking generally, the
BRICS countries appear (like many countries in the world) to
have faced some policy and pragmatic challenges with the theory
and design of the OECD’s arm’s length approach. Brazil has had
transfer pricing rules since 1997. It is quite distinct in its
approach to auditing prices from related transactions. Instead
of an arm’s length approach, Brazil generally employs formulas
to allocate profits between related parties.21
Taxpayers are
permitted to demonstrate that the predetermined rates deviate
from practices of unrelated parties. Russia’s first version of
its transfer pricing rules applied only where the prices
deviated from market prices by 20 percent.22
In 2012, Russia
revisited its transfer pricing legislation and it now applies
the OECD approach.
India introduced transfer pricing in 2001.
India’s approach seems broadly consistent with the approach
endorsed by the OECD.
China adopted transfer pricing rules in
23
2008.
Generally speaking, China’s rules adopt the arm’s length
approach and follow the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. South
Africa’s domestic legislation includes transfer pricing rules,
enacted in 1995 and revised in 2013, that apply to enable the
adjustment of payments between connected parties in the
international context.24 In 1999 the South African Revenue
Service issued a note that made it clear that South Africa
planned to follow the OECD’s 1995 transfer pricing guidelines.
The South African experience with transfer pricing aligns with
many of the broader concerns about the challenges of an arm’s
length approach, including the difficulty of finding comparable
Heleno Taveira Tôrres, “Brazil” IFA Cahier, 2010 Rome
Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of AntiAvoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 161-164.
22 Victor Matchekhin and Roustam Vakhitov, “Russia” in IFA
Cahier, The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments
(IFA, 2006) at 543.
23 Lorenzo Riccardi, Chinese Tax Law and International Treaties
(Springer International Publishing, Switzerland: 2013) at 81 –
102.
24 Lynette Olivier, “South Africa” IFA Cahier, 2010 Rome
Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of AntiAvoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 721.
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prices, the challenges of determining whether a management fee
is appropriate or reasonable, and the potential for applying
overall mechanisms to ensure that the profit division between
related entities is acceptable.
17.4.3 Thin capitalization
In most corporate tax regimes around the world, interest
payments are deductible in calculating domestic profit, while
dividend payments are not.
The result is that corporations in
higher-tax jurisdictions are motivated seek debt investment and
to over-leverage their activities.
Thin capitalization rules
impose some relatively arbitrary limit on the ratio of debt to
equity in a firm’s capital structure. The result is that there
are some limits on the ability of a company to reduce its taxes
in a jurisdiction by paying out excessive interest.
The BRICS countries have, for the most part, included thin
capitalization rules in their domestic legislation, sometimes
with concerns about the interaction of those rules with their
tax treaties.
They have varied in making the policy judgement
about the appropriate debt to equity ratio. Russia’s thin
capitalization rules apply where the foreign company owns more
than a 20 per cent stake in the capital of the company and a 3:1
debt to equity threshold is applied.25 India does not have thin
capitalization rules.
China adopted rules in 2008 that set a
fixed ratio – 5:1 for financial institutions and 2:1 in all
other cases.26 South Africa’s ratio is set at 3:1.27 South Africa
has a noteworthy “headquarter company” regime, which grants
headquarter companies an exemption from its CFC, transfer
pricing, and thin capitalization rules, ostensibly as a means of
encouraging the use of South Africa as a gateway to investment.
17.4.4 Controlled foreign corporation regimes
In 1962, the United States was the first country to enact
controlled foreign corporation rules (CFC rules).
Those rules
Boris Bruk and Roustam Vakhitov, “Russia” IFA Cahier, 2010
Rome Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of
Anti-Avoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 690.
26 Houlu Yang, “China, People’s Republic of” IFA Cahier, 2010
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seek to prevent the deferral of taxation by taxpayers who set up
corporate entities in foreign jurisdictions and retain income in
those foreign entities.
CFC rules attempt to attribute that
income
back
to
the
resident
taxpayer
in
appropriate
circumstances. CFC rules generally require passive income taxed
at low rates to be taxed currently in the home jurisdiction.
The rules, therefore, normally distinguish between passive and
active income, and income earned in countries with higher and
lower tax rates. Tax administrators make a range of tax policy
judgements related to these distinctions and thresholds in the
design of these rules.
Controlled foreign corporation rules are relatively new to BRICS
countries and not all of the countries have adopted them.
Brazil adopted CFC legislation in 2000.
Its model varies from
that adopted in many countries because Brazil taxes shareholders
in all CFCs on all of the CFC income, without distinguishing
between the type of income or the type of foreign tax system.28
India does not have CFC rules, although rules have been
proposed. China adopted CFC rules in 2008.29 Those rules require
determining whether the effective tax rate in the other
jurisdiction is distinctly lower than the rate in China and
determining whether the CFC has earned income mainly through
active business activities. China also produces a “white list”
of countries: if a CFC is located in one of those jurisdictions,
the CFC rules do not apply. South Africa adopted rules in 1997.
Those rules generally provide that where a South African
resident has more than 50 percent participation or votes in a
foreign company, the net income of the company is attributed to
the resident in accordance with the resident’s interest.30
17.5 Exchange of
Administration

Information:

Facilitating

International

Tax

Heleno Taveira Tôrres, “Brazil” IFA Cahier, 2010 Rome
Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of AntiAvoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 158. There was
a court challenge to this at the Supreme Court – did it get
resolved?
29 Houlu Yang, “China, People’s Republic of” IFA Cahier, 2010
Rome Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of
Anti-Avoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 213 – 214.
30 Lynette Olivier, “South Africa” IFA Cahier, 2010 Rome
Congress, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of AntiAvoidance Provisions, volume 95a (IFA, 2010) at 720.
28

As cross-border commerce has increased, the ability of nation
states to enforce their domestic tax rules has arguably become
harder.
In
order
to
enforce
tax
liabilities,
tax
administrations need to be able to access information about the
income of their residents and also of income with a source in
their jurisdiction earned by taxpayers who are not resident.
The tax jurisdiction of nation states imposes a geographical
limit of a states’ enforcement powers to actors and property
within the state. Agreements between countries to exchange tax
information help overcome those international law limits.
A
number of policy issues have to be addressed in the design of
tax
information
exchange,
including:
can
information
be
exchanged spontaneously or automatically or only on request? Do
bank
secrecy
laws
restrict
access
to
information
about
taxpayers’ bank accounts? Can lawyers or others invoke privilege
over some information? Can the jurisdiction assist with
collection?
The BRICS countries, like many countries in the world, have
taken common steps to support information exchange.
Each has
been a signatory to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, although not all have
formally ratified that convention domestically. Each includes a
tax information exchange article in its bilateral tax treaties.
Each has entered into at least some tax information exchange
agreements
(bilateral
agreements
that
address
only
tax
information exchange and not the fuller list of issues addressed
in tax treaties). Beyond that, each country has some unique
aspects to its approach to tax information exchange.
Brazil’s tax treaties include an information exchange article
similar to, but not identical to, the OECD model.
Brazil has
negotiated
a
modest
number
of
tax
information
exchange
agreements.
These agreements, with the exception of the one
with the United States which took six years to ratify after
negotiation, have not yet been ratified.
Notably, the tax
information exchange agreement with the United States does not
require that Brazil (or the United States) ensure that
authorities are able to obtain and provide information held by
financial institutions. The issue of whether or not taxpayers’
bank data can be compelled under Brazil’s constitution remains
live.
Russia’s network of bilateral tax treaties include the OECDstyled exchange of information article.31
Few of Russia’s
Victor Matchekhin, “Russia” IFA Cahier, 2013 Copenhagen
Congress, Exchange of Information and Cross-border Cooperation
Between Tax Authorities, volume 98b (IFA, 2013) at 655.
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bilateral
treaties
enable
assistance
in
collection.
Traditionally, tax authorities could not obtain information
about individuals’ bank accounts; however, where the Russian tax
authorities are acting on the request of a foreign tax
authority, bank secrecy may be waived.
For the most part,
Russian
exchange-of-information
agreements
do
not
enable
automatic or spontaneous exchange of information, although there
are some exceptions. Advocates have a commitment to keep
information related to their legal assistance confidential.
India has agreed to the article on assistance in collection of
taxes with slightly fewer than half of its treaty partners.32
India has entered into a large number of tax information
exchange agreements, although these generally do not allow for
spontaneous or automatic exchange of information.
India has
enacted domestic legislation to reduce the number of countries
that do not agree to information exchange.
The government of
India has been provided with power to restrict deductions and
impose higher withholding taxes, for example, where the other
jurisdiction
does
not
agree
to
an
information
exchange
agreement.
While generally banks are required to provide
information, there are some exceptions where bank secrecy or
other laws protect personal information.
Lawyers do have a
legal professional privilege over some information, however that
privilege is overcome in the case of fraud.
All of China’s tax treaties include the OECD model exchange of
information article.
China’s laws allow it to collect a broad
range of taxpayer information, including information held by
financial institutions.
China has negotiated tax information
exchange agreements with additional countries.
All of South Africa’s double tax treaties include an exchange of
information article, although not all of the articles are based
on the OECD model.33 Generally, South African banks are required
to keep client information secret; however, the general view is
that tax administration is able to obtain bank information for
tax exchange purposes.
Lawyers may invoke professional
privilege over confidential communication.
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17.6 Conclusion:

Prioritizing Goals

International tax laws are generally thought to assist a country
to exact a fair share of tax revenue from cross-board trade and
transit; to support equitable taxation of taxpayers; and to
enhance its economic interests. As this brief review of the tax
policy trends in the BRICS reveals, each jurisdiction strikes a
different balance among the goals.
Perhaps not surprisingly, all of the BRICS countries are more
likely to preserve source-taxation than higher income countries
that adhere strictly to the OECD model tax treaty.
They stake
this ground in different ways in negotiating their bilateral tax
treaties:
sometimes by raising the threshold for the taxation
of business income, sometimes by negotiating to increase the
amount of income that might be allocated to a permanent
establishment, sometimes by pushing for higher withholding tax
rates on interest returns, often by trying to explicitly ensure
that technical services may be taxed at sources, and usually by
preserving
source
taxation
of
other
income.
Perhaps
surprisingly, with the exception of Brazil, each of the BRICS
countries have negotiated an impressive number of tax treaties:
agreements that necessarily require the sacrificed of sourcebased tax revenue.
In the future, one expects that the BRICS
countries may revisit the sensibility of reducing their source
jurisdiction by negotiating tax treaties that unduly restriction
the taxation of business income and reduce the ability to tax
returns to investment. Particularly in the light of the OECD’s
initiatives to reduce base erosion, this is an opportune moment
for BRICS jurisdiction, with their longstanding acceptance of
the theoretical justifications for privileging source taxation,
to lead a shift in the international consensus about the
appropriate balance between residence and source taxation.
Using only the importance of negotiating a tax sparing clause as
a metric, it seems that the BRICS countries have moved somewhat
away from the importance of using the tax system as an incentive
for particular types of foreign investment.
Undoubtedly there
will continue to be tensions between the need to raise tax
revenue
for
public
development
and
the
aspirations
of
governments to attract foreign investment. The BRICS countries
seem well positioned to resist race-to-the-bottom tactics for
the design of their tax systems, however, given their
significant markets and in some cases rich natural resources.
The move away from the use of tax incentives seems appropriate.
The BRICS countries have taken steps, especially recently, to
shore up their domestic tax bases.
Most have adopted thin
capitalization, controlled foreign affiliate, and transfer

pricing rules.
The trend would suggest that in time, those
rules will be common to the community.
The transfer pricing
rules
appear
to
present
both
theoretical
and
pragmatic
challenges for the BRICS, and working together to propose
workable solutions to some of those challenges might be fruitful
given the magnitude of the cross-border activity between BRICS
jurisdictions and other countries.
It is perhaps surprising
that the BRICS countries do not appear to have been overly
concerned about the abuse of tax treaties.
The BRICS countries have been willing to participate in
international exchange of information initiatives, although with
differing levels of commitment and different design features.
Some pressures remain around disclosure of taxpayer information
and spontaneous and automatic information exchanges.
One
expects that as the BRICS’ economic power increases, the ability
to obtain information, and even more so agreements to assist
with enforcement and collection of taxes, will gain in
importance.
A review of the international tax policy decisions reflected in
the tax treaty design of the BRICS countries is revealing.
BRICS jurisdictions have, in the main, highly sophisticated tax
systems that reflect the complex amalgam of their interests and
needs.
Their tax systems are, again generally, very much in
transition.
It seems that with some coordination, there is an
opportunity for BRICS countries to lead a rich discussion and to
help shape, and set, the international tax policy agenda for the
next twenty years.

